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The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) made headlines in
December 2010 when its staff released a “Proposed Framework” for
1
privacy protection on the Internet. Most of the attention was
drawn by a controversial “do not track” proposal that could
significantly restrict the surreptitious collection and use of personal
2
information obtained from individuals browsing online. Relatively
little attention was paid to other parts of the report, which for the
most part continue the FTC’s emphasis on self-regulation and its
preference for notice and choice regimes over mandatory privacy
norms.

† Professor of Law and Cleon H. Foust Fellow, Indiana University School of
Law-Indianapolis.
1. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID
CHANGE: A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS (2010)
[hereinafter PROPOSED FRAMEWORK], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2010/12
/101201privacyreport.pdf.
2. Id. at 63–69.
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This article argues that the FTC, and Congress if necessary,
should recognize that a notice and choice approach to privacy
protection is not likely to protect consumer interests in most
modern day settings. Indeed, policy makers may be doing more
harm than good by continuing to focus on notice and choice,
thereby giving a misleading impression that privacy is being
protected when it is not. Moreover, by adhering to a notice and
choice regime, they avoid discussing the more difficult yet most
fundamental questions in the privacy debate.
Under what
circumstances is data collection likely to harm individuals, and
when is it benign? If a practice is reasonably likely to cause harm,
what is the most effective way to prevent the harm from occurring?
Even if data collection causes no direct harm, should it still be
limited if it undermines other values, such as personal autonomy,
or should we just accept that our lives are increasingly an open
book?
When reviewing the Proposed Framework, one should keep in
mind the agency’s history in this area. For more than two decades,
the FTC has struggled to formulate an effective and coherent
approach to regulating privacy as information technologies
advance at a rapid pace. Beginning in the late 1990s, the agency
conducted studies on consumer privacy preferences and business
3
privacy practices online. The studies confirmed that a vast amount
of personal information was being collected without consumer
knowledge or consent, and use of that data often did not conform
4
to the expectations and preferences of most individuals. The
disconnection between individual preferences and business
practices prompted the FTC to call for national legislation to
mandate fair information policies on the Internet by the end of the
5
twentieth century.
Following stiff resistance from the online business community
and a change in FTC leadership in 2001, the agency quieted its
calls for privacy mandates and, instead, moved to encourage
3. In 2000, the FTC concluded that industry measures were far from
adequate and that national privacy legislation was needed. See FED. TRADE
COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES IN THE ELECTRONIC
MARKETPLACE 38 (2000) [hereinafter FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE 2000],
available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy2000/privacy2000.pdf.
4. Id. at 2, 9–10.
5. Id. at 36–38 (“The proposed legislation would set forth a basic level of
privacy protection for all visitors to consumer-oriented commercial Web sites . . .
.”).
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6

industry self-regulation. The move saw some initial success. The
continuing threat of legislative or regulatory mandates was serious
enough for large online firms to implement voluntary privacy
practices and publish privacy policies that explained, at least in
general terms, what types of information were being collected and
how that information was used. Although smaller online firms
were initially reluctant to follow, many changed their policies after
several large firms announced that they would no longer advertise
7
or link to websites that did not publish their privacy policies.
The FTC lauded this move toward greater transparency in its
8
Privacy policies could be found on
market-driven solution.
countless websites and they fostered an impression among the
general public that most websites collected only information that
was needed for internal purposes, that the personal information
would not be sold, traded, or used for other purposes, and that
adequate security measures were in place. When the policies were
read, however, there was often little privacy protection being
promised. Thus, despite the proliferation of privacy policies
online, consumers’ privacy interests were no better protected than
they were the decade before.
The FTC took a similar approach in other areas where
emerging technologies were raising privacy concerns. In 2005, the
FTC encouraged a self-regulatory privacy regime that focused
largely on disclosure of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID)

6. See Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, The Privacy 2001
Conference: Protecting Consumers’ Privacy: 2002 and Beyond (Oct. 4, 2001)
[hereinafter Muris, The Privacy 2001 Conference], available at http://www.ftc.gov
/speeches/muris/privisp1002.htm(concluding that it is too soon for the FTC to
fashion workable legislation to address strong consumer privacy concerns); see also
Challenges Facing the Federal Trade Commission: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Prot. of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 107th
Cong. 10–34 (2001) (testimony of Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, Fed. Trade
Comm’n), available at http://ftp.resource.org/gpo.gov/hearings/107h/76308.pdf
(noting a majority of the Commission did not support online privacy legislation at
that time and the FTC’s focus would remain on the enforcement of current laws).
7. Jon G. Auerbach, To Get IBM Ad, Sites Must Post Privacy Policies, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 31, 1999, at B1.
8. See Muris, The Privacy 2001 Conference, supra note 6 (“One of the
agency’s successes has been encouraging Internet sites to post privacy notices.”).
Indeed, in 1998, only two percent of all sites had some form of privacy notices.
FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 27 (1998), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy3/priv-23a.pdf. By 2000, virtually all of the
most popular commercial websites had privacy notices. See FED. TRADE COMM’N,
PRIVACY ONLINE 2000, supra note 3, at 10.
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presence and consumer choice on the subject of the expanding use
of RFID technologies in retail and other consumer settings:
Commission staff agrees that industry initiatives can play
an important role in addressing privacy concerns raised by
certain RFID applications. The staff believes that the goal of
such programs should be transparency. For example, when a
retailer provides notice to consumers about the presence of RFID
tags, the notice should be clear, conspicuous, and accurate. The
notice should advise consumers if an RFID tag or reader is
present and if the technology is being used to collect
personally identifiable information about consumers.
This clarity is particularly important when a disclosure
concerns an unfamiliar technology, as is the case with
RFID.
Similarly, if a company’s program provides
consumers with the option of removing the RFID tag, the
company’s practices should make that option easy to
9
exercise by consumers.
EPCglobal, an industry-sponsored organization created to
promote worldwide adoption and standardization of the Electronic
Product Code (an essential part of RFID technology in its current
form), adopted “Guidelines on EPC for Consumer Products” in
10
2005. Consistent with the FTC’s approach, the Guidelines call for
consumer notice and education about RFID use in consumer
transactions, but little in the form of substantive controls on the
11
collection and use of information.
Privacy and civil liberties

9. FED. TRADE COMM’N, RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION: APPLICATIONS AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSUMERS 22–23 (2005) (emphasis added) (citations omitted),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2005/03/050308rfidrpt.pdf. Legislators in
several states and the U.S. Congress have introduced legislation requiring that
consumers be notified when RFID tags and readers are present in public locations,
but no laws have been enacted to date. See Laura Hilder, Defusing the Threat of
RFID: Protecting Consumer Privacy Through Technology-Specific Legislation at the State
Level, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 151–52 (2006) (exploring RFID technology
and legislation strategies to protect consumer privacy); Kyle Sommer, Riding the
Wave: The Uncertain Future of RFID Legislation, 35 J. LEGIS. 48, 68–70 (2009)
(analyzing privacy concerns and legislation specific to RFID technology).
10. Guidelines
on
EPC
for
Consumer
Products,
GS1US.ORG,
http://www.gs1us.org/epcglobal_us/consumer_awareness/guidelines_on_epc_for
_consumer_products (last visited April 16, 2011).
11. Under the Guidelines, companies using RFID tags on products or
packaging should include a label or identifier indicating the presence of the tag.
See id. EPCglobal has developed a template label that companies can use to
inform consumers of the presence of RFID tags. Retailers Tool Kit, GS1.ORG,
http://www.gs1.org/epcglobal/public_policy/retailers_tool_kit (follow “Images”
hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 8, 2011). The template label discloses that a
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groups maintained that in many circumstances it is insufficient
simply to notify consumers that RFID technology is being
employed. Both the Center for Democracy and Technology and
the Electronic Privacy Information Center encouraged a stronger
privacy protection regime, particularly when data collected through
RFID technology can be stored and linked to personal information
about an individual collected either through the RFID system itself
12
or in combination with other databases. Their complaints went
unheeded by EPCglobal, the FTC, Congress, and most state
legislatures.
With respect to behavioral advertising online, in 2009 the FTC
issued a staff report supporting the development of stronger selfregulatory privacy practices, focusing again on the disclosure of
privacy practices and the opportunity for consumers to opt-out of
13
certain behavioral advertising practices on websites that use them.
Except for the collection and use of highly sensitive information,
such as medical information, the report included few substantive
14
privacy mandates.

particular product or package contains an RFID tag that in most cases may be
discarded by a consumer after purchase.
Id.
The Guidelines’ second
requirement, “Consumer Choice,” provides that consumers should be “informed
of the choices that are available to discard or remove or in the future disable RFID
tags from the products they acquire.” See Guidelines on EPC for Consumer Products,
GS1US.ORG, supra note 10. The Guidelines explain that, “for most products, the
EPC tags would be part of disposable packaging or would be otherwise
discardable.” Id. The third prong of the Guidelines provides that consumers
should have “the opportunity easily to obtain accurate information about EPC and
its applications.” Id. The Guidelines state that companies using EPC in a
consumer setting should “familiarise consumers with the EPC logo and . . . help
consumers understand the technology and its benefits.” Id. More information
about the template label is available on the EPCglobal website, along with an
explanation of RFID technology for consumers.
12. CDT Working Group on RFID: Privacy Best Practices for Deployment of RFID
Technology, CDT.ORG, http://www.cdt.org/privacy/20060501rfid-best-practices.php
(last visited Mar. 8, 2011); GUIDELINES ON COMMERCIAL USE OF RFID TECHNOLOGY,
ELEC. PRIVACY INFO. CTR. 2–4 (2004), available at http://epic.org/privacy/rfid
/rfid_gdlnes-070904.pdf.
13. FED. TRADE COMM’N, SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR ONLINE BEHAVIORAL
ADVERTISING
(2009),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2009/02
/P085400behavadreport.pdf.
14. Id. at 42 (“[C]ompanies should only collect sensitive data for behavioral
advertising after they obtain affirmative express consent from the consumer to
receive the advertising.”).
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When the FTC released the new Proposed Framework at the
end of 2010 after it had conducted several workshops and solicited
comments from stakeholders, including many privacy advocates,
some hoped that the agency would signal a shift in its approach
and advocate mandatory privacy norms with less reliance on notice
and consent. While it is still unclear what direction the agency
intends to move, except for the “do not track” proposal, the report
15
largely maintains the status quo. There is a noticeable change in
rhetoric, which may portend a different strategy down the road, but
little more. Signaling what could be a move toward stronger
substantive privacy mandates in the future, the report states that
“companies should adopt a ‘privacy by design’ approach by
building privacy protections into their everyday business
16
practices.”
Companies should maintain reasonable security for
consumer data, collect only the data needed for a specific purpose,
retain data only as long as necessary, and implement reasonable
17
procedures to promote data accuracy.
The agency recognized
18
that “[s]uch concepts are not new,” but the Proposed Framework
suggests that a company’s failure to take such measures could
attract agency attention. It remains to be seen whether the agency
will develop rules or guidelines to implement the “privacy by
design” concept and bring enforcement actions under its
unfairness jurisdiction to demonstrate that “privacy by design”
implies justiciable standards—not merely laudatory goals.
Most of the other proposals assume that notice and choice
should be the dominant approach to privacy protection online, and
that the model need only be improved at the margins to be more
effective. For example, the report proposes that companies
provide choices to consumers about their data practices in a
19
simpler form that would be easier to understand.
Consumers
15. The “do not track” proposal, while controversial, does not signal a
significant shift away from notice and consent. It is one application of a notice
and consent approach that allows individuals to opt-out of data sharing by using a
browser utility that would block certain data collection functions. PROPOSED
FRAMEWORK, supra note 1, at 66. It is only controversial because it makes opting
out of data collection much easier than other largely unsuccessful notice and
consent mechanisms that require considerably more effort to (a) realize that there
is some disclosure and an opt-out opportunity, and (b) navigate the steps
necessary to exercise the option.
16. Id. at v (citation omitted).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 52–53.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol37/iss4/9

6

Nehf: The FTC's Proposed Framework for Privacy Protection Online: A Mov

2011]

THE FTC’S PROPOSED FRAMEWORK

1733

should be able to make more “informed and meaningful choices”
20
Opt-out
about what information they share and with whom.
opportunities should be more clearly described and offered at a
time when the consumer is making a decision about disclosing
21
personal information. Privacy policies should be “clear, concise,
22
and easy-to-read.” The assumption is that if consumers can better
understand privacy notices and are given more opportunities to
make informed choices about sharing information, their interests
will be adequately safeguarded. The guiding principle is that there
is an effective market for information sharing that can be enhanced
by better disclosure and more opportunities for people to make
information sharing choices; for example, consumers could make
informed decisions about revealing information as they interact
23
with online firms.
The ongoing effort to tweak the notice and choice model is
not surprising. Since the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD) guidelines on privacy in 1980, notice
and choice regimes have been recognized as the central part of fair
information practices regardless of the technology being used to
24
collect and store data. The generally accepted norms guiding the
regime are openness and transparency in the collection, storage,
and use of personal information, and faith in the ability of people
to act in their best interests. It assumes that consumers can assert
their privacy preferences if they are given sufficient information.
While notice and choice may have been a viable approach to
protecting privacy in 1980, it is no longer viable following three
decades of technological advancement that have brought us to the
point where we have access to information whenever we want it,
wherever we happen to be, and with the ability to share it almost
instantaneously with anyone we choose.
Giving consumers
opportunities to opt-out of information sharing does not justify

20. Id. at vi.
21. Id. at 57.
22. Id. at vii. See generally George R. Milne, Mary J. Culnan & Henry Greene, A
Longitudinal Assessment of Online Privacy Notice Readability, 25 J. PUB. POL’Y &
MARKETING 238 (2006) (evaluating the readability of 312 online privacy notices
and arguing that such readability should be improved as a matter of marketing
and public policy).
23. See Milne, Culnan & Greene, supra note 22, at 238.
24. See, e.g., OECD GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND
TRANSBORDER FLOWS OF PERSONAL DATA (1980) (recognizing the importance of
notice and disclosure for privacy concerns internationally).
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excessive data collection, transfers of personal information to
others for uses not contemplated by the individual who revealed it,
or failure to create and maintain reasonable storage security
measures. Notice and choice must be supplanted by responsible
information practices throughout the data collection and storage
process, mandated by law if necessary. The FTC’s approach to
privacy is essentially backwards: a privacy regime should be most
concerned with limiting the collection and dissemination of
personal information in the first place because once the
information is collected its subsequent use cannot be controlled.
Questions of informed consent should only be considered at the
margins.
Under the FTC’s self-regulatory principles, protecting
consumer privacy is largely the responsibility of individuals who are
expected to learn about the privacy practices of data collectors and
25
take steps to minimize privacy risks.
This self-policing model
could be made effective by enhanced notice and choice
opportunities if individuals were capable of protecting their privacy
preferences. Unfortunately, for many reasons, they are not.
I.

LACK OF TRANSPARENCY MAKES DECISION MAKING PURE
GUESSWORK

The data collection, storage, and manipulation industry is
becoming more sophisticated and less transparent every day. The
vast majority of data collection and sharing practices occur outside
26
public view. Our personal information is stored, searched, and
transmitted every day; yet, we have no idea what the ramifications
may be (good or bad) or what decisions are being made in reliance
on it. If we do not understand what is going on behind the scenes,
then information practices that many of us would object to will
27
largely go undetected. No matter how much notice we are given,
25. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK, supra note 1, at 40 (“For example, although the
proposed framework provides for notice and choice, it aims to simplify how
companies present such notice and choice and to reduce the degree to which
privacy protection depends on them.”).
26. See generally Victoria Bellotti, Design for Privacy in Multimedia Computing and
Communications, in TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY: THE NEW LANDSCAPE 63, 64–66
(Philip E. Agre & Marc Rotenberg eds., 1997) (discussing how ubiquitous
computing and new user-friendly interfaces obscure data collecting intrusions on
privacy).
27. Cf. Robert LaRose & Nora J. Rifon, Promoting i-Safety: Effects of Privacy
Warnings and Privacy Seals on Risk Assessment and Online Privacy Behavior, 41 J.
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we cannot evaluate the risk of potential harms, make informed
decisions, seek redress, or stop harms from recurring because we
cannot comprehend the benefits or the risks at the time when a
28
decision has to be made.
II.

VALUING PRIVACY IS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE

Even with more information and choices available, individuals
cannot effectively value their personal information. Notice and
choice solutions presume that we can value our privacy rights in
29
some meaningful way.
Only then can we make self-interested
choices about whether and how to share information, and whether
to take the time or expend the effort to safeguard that information.
When it is impossible to know where our information will end up
and how it will be used, it is difficult to assess the risks associated
with releasing information or failing to monitor its use once we
have given someone access to it. We might think we are only
providing harmless facts and boring details, and we may perceive
the risk as small compared to the benefits being offered by a data
collector, not knowing how or when the seemingly harmless
information might be shared or used in a way that will cause us
30
harm.
There is a high degree of information asymmetry;
collectors of information know what they intend to do with the
31
data, but individuals who provide the data do not. Under these

CONSUMER AFF. 127, 128 (2007) (suggesting that consumers do not understand the
implications of sharing personal information because of inadequate privacy
policies and seals).
28. See Robert W. Hahn & Anne Layne-Farrar, The Benefits and Costs of Online
Privacy Legislation, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 85, 103 (2002) (“Once an individual has sold
her personal information, she loses much control over it. . . . Because of the
immense amounts of data about any given individual already in the public
domain, how would that individual verify when a contract was broken?”).
29. See generally Curt J. Dommeyer & Barbara J. Gross, What Consumers Know
and What They Do: An Investigation of Consumer Knowledge, Awareness, and Use of
Privacy Protection Strategies, 17 J. INTERACTIVE MARKETING 34 (2003) (discussing a
study on consumer awareness and use of privacy protection strategies).
30. See LaRose & Rifon, supra note 27, at 129 (“Internet privacy poses
something of a paradox, some say even a fallacy. Surveys show that concerns about
online privacy are widespread. . . . [But] Internet users willingly divulge personal
information to obtain ‘free’ information, personalized content, customized
discounts, prizes, loyalty program memberships, cajoling interactions with
automated shopping ‘agents,’ or some other form of ‘fair exchange.’” (citations
omitted)).
31. See generally HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 440 (3d ed. 1992)
(providing a microeconomic analysis of how asymmetric information affects
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conditions, individuals may undervalue (or overvalue) its release
because they are unaware of the risks and benefits. Because they
have no basis for valuing their information, decisions will nearly
always be less than optimal.
III.

AGGREGATION OF DATA IMPOSES UNKNOWABLE RISKS

A related problem is the difficulty in valuing specific pieces of
personal information out of context. How does one value one’s
holiday shopping habits? To value this information with even
rough accuracy (e.g., assess the risk of future harm resulting from
someone having access to the data), one needs to know how the
information will be used. The information might be sold to a
marketing firm in the aggregate (along with data from other
anonymous shoppers) without any personal identification, in which
case its value to any particular person is nominal because the risks
of future harm are small. Opting out of such data sharing is totally
unnecessary, and from a societal point of view, the decision is
inefficient because it deprives the data collector of potentially
useful information while not remotely benefiting the individual.
On the other hand, if the information is transferred and
aggregated with other information that can link the data to an
individual, we might value it much higher. If a person thought it
could lead to identity theft, the information might not be released
32
at any price. The problem is that once information is stored and
is capable of being accessed, we lose control over its use, and we
seldom have enough knowledge to evaluate the risk of future harm.
Making meaningful choices under these circumstances is
impossible.

behaviors and strategic interactions between persons).
32. Cf. Kurt M. Saunders & Bruce Zucker, Counteracting Identity Fraud in the
Information Age: The Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act, 8 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 661 (1999) (describing identity theft methods and the importance of
one’s identity). See generally Sean B. Hoar, Identity Theft: The Crime of the New
Millennium, 80 OR. L. REV. 1423 (2001) (describing how identity theft occurs and
ways to prevent it).
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LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY RENDERS PRIVACY DECISIONS
LESS MEANINGFUL

There are insurmountable accountability problems with
today’s data collection and sharing practices. Tracing harm to a
particular source or data breach will usually be impossible. If a
person is affected in some way by the unexpected misuse of
personal information, even noticing the problem may be difficult,
and tracing the problem to a particular release of information will
be nearly impossible because information about us resides in so
33
many databases.
Without accountability, market forces cannot
effectively curb wrongful behavior. Moreover, injury resulting from
data collection and sharing, while economic in some cases, can be
impossible to undo even if it is discovered and traced to a
particular source. Many injuries resulting from identity theft, lost
employment opportunities, and reputation damage cannot be
compensated even if the harmful information can be traced to a
particular source.
Most importantly, without accountability,
individuals faced with decisions about sharing personal
information are left essentially with two unappealing choices: (1)
prohibit the release of information wherever possible because one
never knows where it will end up; or (2) do not be concerned with
the release of information because such collection and use is
inevitable and injuries are untraceable, so you can expect no
redress for any adverse effects. With either decision, the choice is
ill-informed and not likely to be consistent with the best interests of
the individual.
V.

ACCURATE CHOICES ARE COMPROMISED BY COMPETING
GOALS

When making decisions about whether to divulge personal
information, people compromise between their desire for complete
accuracy (balancing the costs and benefits of the decision) and
34
their desire to achieve other rational goals.
Other than

33. Hahn & Layne-Farrar, supra note 28, at 103 (“How do I know, for
example, where a firm obtained my email address? Was it from me or some other
available source that was legal? Vast amounts of personal data are already in the
public domain.
Consider, for example, telephone directories, employee
personnel databases, credit reports, and other public or semi-public sources.”).
34. Cf. Ellen C. Garbarino & Julie A. Edell, Cognitive Effort, Affect, and Choice,
24 J. CONSUMER RES. 147, 148 (1997) (examining cognitive effort and its influence
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maximizing the accuracy of the decision, another important
35
decision-making goal is the minimization of cognitive effort.
When making decisions, people tend to expend only as much
effort as they need to reach what they perceive is a satisfactory
36
decision, even if it is not optimal. Unless the decision is of great
importance, people tend to make choices that are easier to
implement, though less accurate, because important factors are left
37
out of the decision-making process. Thus, giving individuals more
disclosure and better opportunities to opt-out of information
sharing is not likely to lead to more accurate decisions. Except for
the most obviously sensitive information, people are not likely to
expend the cognitive effort necessary to weigh the pros and cons.
They will not perceive the stakes being high enough, so they will
not even try to make a decision that serves their best interests.
VI.

PRACTICAL PROBLEMS MAKE PRIVACY LESS SALIENT

Even when someone wants to evaluate privacy alternatives and
make self-interested decisions, practical problems create obstacles
that impede optimal decision making. The most important are
time constraints. When people feel that they should make a
decision quickly, people switch from more careful decision-making
38
strategies to simpler ones that result in a faster decision. While

on choice outcomes). See generally Jacob Jacoby, Is It Rational to Assume Consumer
Rationality? Some Consumer Psychological Perspectives on Rational Choice Theory, 6
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 81 (2000) (examining the limitations of rational choice
theories); Patricia A. Norberg, Daniel R. Horne & David A. Horne, The Privacy
Paradox: Personal Information Disclosure Intentions Versus Behaviors, 41 J. CONSUMER
AFF. 100 (2007) (discussing the privacy paradox and public policy about
preserving one’s sense of privacy).
35. James R. Bettman, Mary Frances Luce, & John W. Payne, Constructive
Consumer Choice Processes, 25 J. CONSUMER RES. 187, 192–93 (1998) (providing a
framework for understanding constructive consumer choice).
36. Garbarino & Edell, supra note 34, at 148.
37. Id. at 149; see Eric J. Johnson, John W. Payne & James R. Bettman,
Information Displays and Preference Reversals, 42 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 1, 2 (1988) (discussing the frequency and occurrence of preference
reversals and implications for information displays); Denis A. Lussier & Richard W.
Olshavsky, Task Complexity and Contingent Processing in Brand Choice, 6 J. CONSUMER
RES. 154, 154 (1979) (reporting results of a study on consumer choice strategy).
38. See also Bettman, Luce & Payne, supra note 35, at 200 (discussing the
effects of time pressure on choice processes); Peter Wright, The Harassed Decision
Maker: Time Pressures, Distractions, and the Use of Evidence, 59 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 555
(1974) (studying the effects of time pressure and distraction on an individual’s
decision-making process). See generally John W. Payne, James R. Bettman & Mary
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there may be plenty of time to read the privacy practices of each
website visited and make a choice about information sharing on
each one, to do so would frustrate one of the principal benefits of
going online—a fast and convenient way to learn, communicate,
and purchase goods and services. Surfing the Internet would take
forever if the privacy practices and opt-out procedures were
explored at each site. Regardless of time constraints, as people
make choices about whether and how to interact with a particular
website, privacy concerns have to be perceived as important
enough to capture their attention. If other attributes of the site are
deemed more important (e.g., site content, ease of use, desirable
interactive features), privacy alternatives are not likely to be
explored before information is shared with the site.
VII.

BEHAVIORAL HEURISTICS IMPACT PRIVACY CHOICES

Several behavioral factors make it unlikely that decisions about
information sharing will be made with an accurate balancing of the
benefits and risks.
Inferences play an important role in a person’s decision
whether to share information, yet they often lead to inaccurate
privacy choices. If the information necessary to making an
informed decision is difficult to obtain, people infer the missing
information from information that is more readily available.
People may assume that a particular attribute is similar across
brands (e.g., the privacy practices of all banks are probably about
the same), or people may infer a value that corresponds to the
values they assign to other attributes of the party with whom they
are interacting (e.g., if my personal banker is trustworthy and
39
caring, the bank’s privacy practices are likely trustworthy as well).

Frances Luce, When Time Is Money: Decision Behavior Under Opportunity-Cost Time
Pressure, 66 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 131 (1996), available at
http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~jrb12/bio/Jim/46.pdf (investigating decision
processes in environments where there is time stress due to the opportunity-cost of
delaying decisions); Rik Pieters, Luk Warlop & Michel Hartog, The Effect of Time
Pressure and Task Motivation on Visual Attention to Brands, 24 ADVANCES IN CONSUMER
RES. 281 (1997) (discussing a study of consumer choices under various time pressure
settings), available at http://www.acrwebsite.org/volumes/display.asp?id=7883.
39. See, e.g., Gary T. Ford & Ruth Ann Smith, Inferential Beliefs in Consumer
Evaluations: An Assessment of Alternative Processing Strategies, 14 J. CONSUMER RES. 363,
370 (1987) (discussing results of a study that shows consumers employ a samebrand strategy in inference formation); Richard D. Johnson & Irwin P. Levin, More
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Some inferences may be justified, but others will lead to privacy
decisions that do not reflect the person’s actual preferences.
Framing effects may also adversely affect the accuracy of
decisions. People tend to process information in a way that is
consistent with how it was presented to them, accepting it in its
presented form without questioning the details or inquiring
40
further. These framing effects are well-known in the marketing
41
industry and are most pronounced when the cost of accepting a
42
particular presentation on its face is perceived to be low. Only if
the cost of acceptance is perceived to be high, or if the information
is presented in a confusing way, will people discount the form of
the presentation and seek additional information before making a
decision. This is one reason why many links to privacy policies and
opt-out opportunities contain language such as, “We value your

Than Meets the Eye: The Effect of Missing Information on Purchase Evaluations, 12 J.
CONSUMER RES. 169 (1985) (exploring the effect of missing information on the
processes of evaluation and decision making); Birger Wernerfelt, Umbrella
Branding as a Signal of New Product Quality: An Example of Signalling by Posting a Bond,
19 RAND J. ECON. 458 (1988) (discussing “umbrella branding” in which a
multiproduct firm uses its reputation and established products to introduce a new
product); Michael D. Smith & Erik Brynjolfsson, Consumer Decision-Making at an
Internet Shopbot 11 (MIT Sloan Sch. of Mgmt. Ctr. for eBusiness, Working Paper
No. 137, 2001) (finding that brand is an important determinant of consumer
choice),
available
at
http://ebusiness.mit.edu/research/papers/137
_erikbinternetshopbots.pdf.
40. See James R. Bettman & Michel A. Zins, Information Format and Choice Task
Effects in Decision Making, 6 J. CONSUMER RES. 141, 142 (1979) (“[C]onsumers
appear to process information in ways congruent with the presentation format,
processing the information as it is structured, without rearranging it.”); see also
Paul Slovic, From Shakespeare to Simon: Speculations—and Some Evidence—About Man’s
Ability to Process Information, 12 OR. RES. INST. 12 (1972) (summarizing research
experiments on decision making and explaining their implications), available at
http://www.decisionresearch.org/pdf/dr36.pdf; W. Kip Viscusi, Wesley A. Magat
& Joel Huber, An Investigation of the Rationality of Consumer Valuations of Multiple
Health Risks, 18 RAND J. ECON. 465, 477–78 (1987) (describing consumers’
responses to risk valuations); W. Kip Viscusi, Individual Rationality, Hazard
Warnings, and the Foundations of Tort Law, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 625, 634–36 (1996)
(citing the frame of reference as one factor that affects the utility of hazard
warnings).
41. See, e.g., Irwin P. Levin & Gary J. Gaeth, How Consumers Are Affected by the
Framing of Attribute Information Before and After Consuming the Product, 15 J.
CONSUMER RES. 374 (1988) (discussing the implications of framing effects on
consumer behavior in marketing products).
42. See Eloise Coupey, Restructuring: Constructive Processing of Information
Displays in Consumer Choice, 21 J. CONSUMER RES. 83, 96–97 (1994) (summarizing
the differing reasons for consumer restructuring).
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43

privacy,” rather than “You are about to divulge information that
could harm you in the future. Click here to be sure you want to
proceed.”
If the presentation form appears safe and
unthreatening, individuals are less likely to dig beneath the surface
and determine the strength of the site’s privacy practices for
themselves.
Another behavioral tendency is that people overreact to risks
that are well-known because of news coverage or other events that
bring the subject to their attention. Such risks are “available” in
people’s minds, and they therefore think the matter is important
44
enough to make an informed decision. Conversely, people tend
to underreact to risks when they are not in the forefront of the
mind. This availability heuristic becomes most relevant when
people make decisions based on the perceived probability of
certain events happening. People underestimate the likelihood of
certain events occurring if those events do not come to their
attention very often. People may underestimate the effects of
information disclosure and its potential costs if the adverse
consequences of weak privacy practices come to their attention
only infrequently. While there is a fair amount of publicity about
security leaks and unauthorized access to consumer databases,
consumers seldom hear about the actual harms resulting from
those privacy practices. Hearing about the occasional database
breach raises a general societal concern about privacy, but we
seldom hear that any particular consumer problem was traced to a
specified data breach, or that particular types of information
disclosure are more dangerous than others. Thus, while publicity
can increase the societal concern about information privacy, it does
not necessarily raise the saliency of privacy in any particular
decision-making process in our daily lives. If people do not see a
particular information disclosure as a risky activity, they will not

43. See,
e.g.,
We
Value
Your
Privacy,
MY WORK BUTTERFLY,
http://www.myworkbutterfly.com/page/we-value-your-privacy (last visited Feb. 25,
2011) (containing the privacy policy of Butterfly, a working mothers’ social
network). After the “We Value Your Privacy” title and introductory language, the
policy states that if it acquires or is acquired by another business, the site
“reserve[s] the right to transfer all of MyWorkButterfly.com’s User information,
including email addresses, to a separate entity or Platform.” Id.
44. See generally Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk
Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683, 685 (1999) (“The purpose of this article is to
identify a set of interlinked social mechanisms that have important, sometimes
desirable, but at other times harmful effects on risk regulation.”).
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invest time and effort deciding whether the disclosure is actually in
their best interest.
People are not good at making accurate decisions about lowprobability risks—which are particularly important to privacy
decisions. People tend to either overestimate the probability and
take unnecessary precautions or ignore the risk and do nothing.
Unless the unlikely occurrence is potentially catastrophic (e.g., the
slight risk of a home burning causes us to purchase fire insurance),
we are not willing to invest much time, money, or effort to reduce
45
or evaluate a risk we think is not likely to occur. People tend to
view low-probability risks as either safe or unsafe, and overestimate
46
or underestimate the likelihood of the event occurring. This is
one reason why some people refuse to reveal personal information
whenever they are asked to do so, regardless of how harmless it may
be (e.g., zip code request at a check-out register), while others do
not think twice before disclosing private information to strangers.
In addition, people are more likely to make the effort to evaluate
risks (whether high- or low-probability) if they have prior
47
experience with that type of risk. Thus, people who have been
victimized by identity theft may take time to exercise more opt-out
rights, while those who have not do not bother.
Finally, if there is immediate and concrete feedback about the
accuracy of a decision, people tend to spend more effort trying to
48
get that decision right. Conversely, if feedback about the accuracy
of a decision is delayed or never comes, less effort is made to make

45. Gary H. McClelland, William D. Schulze & Don L. Coursey, Insurance for
Low-Probability Hazards: A Bimodal Response to Unlikely Events, 7 J. RISK AND
UNCERTAINTY 95, 109 (1993) (concluding that “[i]ndividuals appear either to
dismiss low-probability risks . . . or to worry about the risk [too] much”).
46. For example, when asked about the risks of lung cancer to smokers, both
smokers and nonsmokers generally overestimate the risk. W. Kip Viscusi et al.,
Smoking Risks in Spain: Part III—Determinants of Smoking Behavior 2 (Harv. Law Sch.,
John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., and Bus., Discussion Paper No. 306, Nov. 2000),
available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/306.pdf.
47. See Bettman, Luce & Payne, supra note 35, at 188 (“People are most likely
to have well-articulated preferences when they are familiar and experienced with
the preference object, and rational choice theory may be most applicable in such
situations.”).
48. See id. at 193 (listing one of the most important goals for consumer
decision making is maximizing the accuracy of the choice); see also Hillel J.
Einhorn, Learning from Experience and Suboptimal Rules in Decision Making, in
COGNITIVE PROCESSES IN CHOICE AND DECISION BEHAVIOR 1, 2 (Thomas S. Wallsten
ed., 1980) (noting “outcome feedback” is the main source of information for
evaluating the quality of decision making).
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a decision that best fits our interests. This is important because the
correctness of any decision about revealing personal information
usually will not be apparent until long after the transaction has
ended or, more likely, never. Only rarely will someone be able to
trace the spam, identity theft, profiling, pop-up advertisement, junk
mail, or other effects of information sharing to a particular data
collector’s privacy practices. Without feedback on our decisions
about disclosing information, we have no way of knowing whether
our decisions were good or bad. If the results of the decision will
likely never be known, we do not invest much time trying to make
the right choice.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

In the last few years, much has changed about the way people
reveal personal information. Today, a vast number of individuals
access information from portable laptops, handheld phones, ereaders, and other devices at all hours of the day, from land, air,
and sea locations throughout the world.
Whether we are
interacting on social networks or researching the latest news story
online, we are constantly giving and receiving information about
ourselves, whether knowingly or not. It is not surprising that firms
have developed technologies and business plans that use our
information in ways that were unimaginable a short time ago.
The FTC should be commended for issuing the Proposed
Framework. In particular, the FTC’s foundational principles of
“privacy by design,” if they are more than hopeful aspirations, may
lead to meaningful substantive controls on the collection and use
of personal information in the years to come. The Proposed
Framework states that protecting privacy online should be the
default position, information should only be collected and stored
as needed, privacy should be protected throughout the information
life cycle, and privacy practices should be designed with respect for
49
individual interests from the start. If these principles are widely
adopted, companies will build applications that only gather and
share information as needed, and they will build in privacy
protections with individual users in mind. This would be a
fundamental shift, but without legal mandates, one wonders
49. See generally PROPOSED FRAMEWORK, supra note 1 (calling on companies
and policymakers to promote consumer privacy, simplified consumer choice, and
greater transparency of data practices).
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whether it will actually happen.
If the substantive controls of “privacy by design” are not widely
adopted (e.g., if the FTC does not undertake an aggressive
enforcement program to ensure adoption), all that remains in the
Proposed Framework is an enhanced notice and choice regime that
requires us to police our own privacy interests in situations where
we are increasingly ill-equipped to do so. No matter how clear,
conspicuous, and timely privacy notices and opt-out opportunities
may be, people will seldom make decisions that accurately reflect
their privacy preferences. Insurmountable problems regarding the
transparency of privacy and data aggregation practices, the inability
to hold firms accountable for harms caused by maintaining
suboptimal privacy practices, and the practical realities and
behavioral tendencies of individuals making decisions about
privacy matters in an online environment all render even an
enhanced notice and choice approach to privacy wholly ineffectual.
If the FTC is serious about privacy protection, it will move
aggressively to ensure that the substantive controls in its “privacy by
design” initiative become the norm and abandon the outdated
notion that personal information can be adequately protected by
disclosure and individual decision making.
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